Can a Shorter Workweek Induce Higher Employment? : Mandatory Reductions in the Workweek and Employment Subsidies /
A reduction in the legal workweek may induce a degree of downward wage flexibility, while an employment subsidy to firms accommodates downward wage rigidity. It may be possible, therefore, to increase employment with a policy that combines a reduction in the workweek with an employment subsidy. In g...
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| Natura: | Periodico |
| Lingua: | English |
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Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1999.
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| Serie: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1999/144 |
| Accesso online: | Full text available on IMF |
| Riassunto: | A reduction in the legal workweek may induce a degree of downward wage flexibility, while an employment subsidy to firms accommodates downward wage rigidity. It may be possible, therefore, to increase employment with a policy that combines a reduction in the workweek with an employment subsidy. In general, however, the long-run employment outcome is ambiguous, and a decline in output cannot be ruled out. More direct policy measures whose impact can be assessed with greater certainty-in particular, removing structural rigidities in the labor market-should be given priority to decrease long term unemployment. |
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| Descrizione del documento: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (33 pages) |
| Natura: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Accesso: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |