Country Risks and the Investment Activity of U.S. Multinationals in Developing Countries /

This paper develops a simple real options model that demonstrates the role of country-specific risk and sunk costs in determining a multinational's choice between exports and foreign investment. The hypotheses from the model are tested for the distribution of capital expenditures by U.S.-owned...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor Principal: Lehmann, Alexander
Formato: Revista
Idioma:English
Publicado: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/133
Acceso en liña:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Country Risks and the Investment Activity of U.S. Multinationals in Developing Countries /  |c Alexander Lehmann. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 1999. 
300 |a 1 online resource (27 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper develops a simple real options model that demonstrates the role of country-specific risk and sunk costs in determining a multinational's choice between exports and foreign investment. The hypotheses from the model are tested for the distribution of capital expenditures by U.S.-owned foreign affiliates in 29 developing countries during 1984-95. Political and economic risk ratings are identified as deterrents to foreign capital formation; scale economies, unit wage differentials, trade openness, and agglomeration effects are found to be stimulating. These findings provide an additional rationale for a multilateral investment agreement that could function as an agency of restraint. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 1999/133 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/133/001.1999.issue-133-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library