Bailout and Conglomeration /
The paper suggests that when firms differ stochastically in their productivity, a bank may find it optimal not to bail out the failed nonconglomerate firms at all, but to bail out conglomerates fully. Expectation of such bailout policy may encourage risk-averse firms to join a conglomerate to minimi...
Главный автор: | Kim, Se-Jik |
---|---|
Формат: | Журнал |
Язык: | English |
Опубликовано: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1999.
|
Серии: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1999/108 |
Online-ссылка: | Full text available on IMF |
Схожие документы
-
Timing of International Bailouts /
по: Kim, Se-Jik
Опубликовано: (2004) -
Bailouts and Systemic Insurance /
по: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
Опубликовано: (2013) -
Regional Financial Conglomerates : A Case for Improved Supervision /
по: Olafsson, Thorvardur Tjoervi
Опубликовано: (2005) -
Bank Bailouts : Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect /
по: Levy Yeyati, Eduardo
Опубликовано: (1999) - Industrial Conglomerates Industry Profile: Global