Bank Bailouts : Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect /
This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweigh...
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Weitere Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Zeitschrift |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1999.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1999/106 |
| Online Zugang: | Full text available on IMF |