Bank Bailouts : Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect /

Bank Bailouts : Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect /

This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweigh...

पूर्ण विवरण

ग्रंथसूची विवरण
मुख्य लेखक:	Levy Yeyati, Eduardo
अन्य लेखक:	Cordella, Tito
स्वरूप:	पत्रिका
भाषा:	English
प्रकाशित:	Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1999.
श्रृंखला:	IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1999/106
ऑनलाइन पहुंच:	Full text available on IMF

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