Bank Bailouts : Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect /
This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweigh...
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
|---|---|
| مؤلفون آخرون: | |
| التنسيق: | دورية |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1999.
|
| سلاسل: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1999/106 |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Full text available on IMF |