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01419cas a2200253 a 4500 |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451852875
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Levy Yeyati, Eduardo.
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|a Bank Bailouts :
|b Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect /
|c Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Tito Cordella.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 1999.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (30 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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| 500 |
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Cordella, Tito.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 1999/106
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/106/001.1999.issue-106-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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