Bank Bailouts : Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect /
This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweigh...
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| Format: | Revija |
| Jezik: | English |
| Izdano: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1999.
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| Serija: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1999/106 |
| Online dostop: | Full text available on IMF |
| Izvleček: | This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy. |
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| Opis knjige/članka: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Fizični opis: | 1 online resource (30 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Dostop: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |