A Model of the Lender of Last Resort /
This paper develops a model of the lender of last resort. It provides an analytical basis for 'too big too fail' and a rationale for 'constructive ambiguity'. Key results are that if contagion (moral hazard) is the main concern, the Central Bank (CB) will have an excessive (littl...
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Awduron Eraill: | |
Fformat: | Cylchgrawn |
Iaith: | English |
Cyhoeddwyd: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1999.
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Cyfres: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1999/039 |
Mynediad Ar-lein: | Full text available on IMF |