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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451844788
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Choueiri, Nada.
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|a A Model of Contagious Currency Crises with Application to Argentina /
|c Nada Choueiri.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 1999.
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|a 1 online resource (26 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper proposes a model of contagious currency crises: crises transmit across countries by raising the risk premium on government bonds. Three types of equilibria can occur: a 'no-collapse' equilibrium (crises never transmit from abroad); a 'collapse' equilibrium (crises are inevitably contagious); or a 'fundamentals' equilibrium (crises are contagious if domestic fundamentals are weak). A calibration exercise finds that the 1995 turmoil in Argentina coexisted with a combination of risk-averse investors and weak credibility in the currency board arrangement. This turmoil could only be attributed to a Tequila effect from the Mexican crisis alone if investors were excessively risk-averse.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 1999/029
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1999/029/001.1999.issue-029-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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