Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry /

The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers' creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
Format: Journal
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1998.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1998/092
Online Access:Full text available on IMF
Description
Summary:The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers' creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.
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Physical Description:1 online resource (31 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Access:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students