Employment Protection, International Specialization, and innovation /
We develop a model to analyze the implications of firing costs on incentives for R and D and international specialization. The key idea is that, to avoid paying firing costs, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cyc...
| मुख्य लेखक: | |
|---|---|
| स्वरूप: | पत्रिका |
| भाषा: | English |
| प्रकाशित: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1996.
|
| श्रृंखला: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1996/016 |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | Full text available on IMF |
| सारांश: | We develop a model to analyze the implications of firing costs on incentives for R and D and international specialization. The key idea is that, to avoid paying firing costs, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country and then move to the high firing cost country. We show that in the closed economy, an increase in firing costs does not necessarily imply a reduction in R and D; it crucially depends on the riskiness of R and D activity relative to production activity. In the open economy, however, an increase in firing cost is much more likely to reduce R and D intensity. |
|---|---|
| वस्तु वर्णन: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| भौतिक वर्णन: | 1 online resource (24 pages) |
| स्वरूप: | Mode of access: Internet |
| आईएसएसएन: | 1018-5941 |
| अभिगमन: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |