Breakdown in Pakistan: how aid is eroding institutions for collective action /
| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Libro |
| Lingua: | English |
| Pubblicazione: |
Stanford, California :
Stanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press,
[2012].
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| Soggetti: | |
| Classic Catalogue: | View this record in Classic Catalogue |
Sommario:
- Revisiting the collective action dilemma
- Intrinsic or extrinsic incentives : the evolution of cooperative groups in Pakistan
- Why cooperate? : motives and decisions of initiators and joiners in other-regarding groups
- Why cooperate? : motives and decisions of initiators and joiners in self-regarding groups
- Does aid break down cooperation?
- Why aid breaks down cooperation
- Fixing incentives : the way forward.