Breakdown in Pakistan: how aid is eroding institutions for collective action /
المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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التنسيق: | كتاب |
اللغة: | English |
منشور في: |
Stanford, California :
Stanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press,
[2012].
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الموضوعات: | |
Classic Catalogue: | View this record in Classic Catalogue |
جدول المحتويات:
- Revisiting the collective action dilemma
- Intrinsic or extrinsic incentives : the evolution of cooperative groups in Pakistan
- Why cooperate? : motives and decisions of initiators and joiners in other-regarding groups
- Why cooperate? : motives and decisions of initiators and joiners in self-regarding groups
- Does aid break down cooperation?
- Why aid breaks down cooperation
- Fixing incentives : the way forward.