De-risking private power in Bangladesh: How financing design can stop collusive contracting

De-risking private power in Bangladesh: How financing design can stop collusive contracting

This article was published in The Energy Policy [©2022 Rights managed by Elsevier] and the definite version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113146 The Article's website is at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421522003718?via%3Dihub

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Khan, Mushtaq, Watkins, Mitchell, Zahan, Iffat
Formato: Journal article
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Elsevier 2024
Materias:
Fiscal policy
Economic growth
Short run
Long run
Growth effects
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10361/23725

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/10361/23725

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