Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
This article was published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics [©2018 Published by Oxford University Press] and the definite version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 The Article's website is at: https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/281/5106373
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| Online Zugang: | http://hdl.handle.net/10361/16284 https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 |
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10361-162842022-03-27T05:19:58Z Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts Burchardi, Konrad B Gulesci, Selim Lerva, Benedetta Sulaiman, Munshi BRAC Institute of Governance and Development Agriculture Crops Farmers Productivity This article was published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics [©2018 Published by Oxford University Press] and the definite version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 The Article's website is at: https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/281/5106373 Agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries. Output-sharing rules that make farmers less-than-full residual claimants are seen as a potentially important driver of low agricultural productivity. We report results from a field experiment designed to estimate and understand the effects of sharecropping contracts on agricultural input choices, risk-taking, and output. The experiment induced variation in the terms of sharecropping contracts. After agreeing to pay 50% of their output to the landlord, tenants were randomized into three groups: (i) some kept 50% of their output; (ii) others kept 75%; (iii) others kept 50% of output and received a lump-sum payment at the end of their contract, either fixed or stochastic. We find that tenants with higher output shares used more inputs, cultivated riskier crops, and produced 60% more output relative to control. Income or risk exposure have at most a small effect on farm output; the increase in output should be interpreted as an incentive effect of the output-sharing rule. Published 2022-02-20T08:54:20Z 2022-02-20T08:54:20Z 2018 2018 Journal Article http://hdl.handle.net/10361/16284 https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 en_US https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/281/5106373 The Quarterly Journal of Economics Oxford Academic |
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Brac University |
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Institutional Repository |
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en_US |
| topic |
Agriculture Crops Farmers Productivity |
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Agriculture Crops Farmers Productivity Burchardi, Konrad B Gulesci, Selim Lerva, Benedetta Sulaiman, Munshi Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts |
| description |
This article was published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics [©2018 Published by Oxford University Press] and the definite version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 The Article's website is at: https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/281/5106373 |
| author2 |
BRAC Institute of Governance and Development |
| author_facet |
BRAC Institute of Governance and Development Burchardi, Konrad B Gulesci, Selim Lerva, Benedetta Sulaiman, Munshi |
| format |
Journal Article |
| author |
Burchardi, Konrad B Gulesci, Selim Lerva, Benedetta Sulaiman, Munshi |
| author_sort |
Burchardi, Konrad B |
| title |
Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts |
| title_short |
Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts |
| title_full |
Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts |
| title_fullStr |
Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Moral hazard: Experimental evidence from tenancy contracts |
| title_sort |
moral hazard: experimental evidence from tenancy contracts |
| publisher |
Oxford Academic |
| publishDate |
2022 |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10361/16284 https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy023 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT burchardikonradb moralhazardexperimentalevidencefromtenancycontracts AT gulesciselim moralhazardexperimentalevidencefromtenancycontracts AT lervabenedetta moralhazardexperimentalevidencefromtenancycontracts AT sulaimanmunshi moralhazardexperimentalevidencefromtenancycontracts |
| _version_ |
1814308819981828096 |