Guaranteed Minimum Income Schemes in Europe : Landscape and Design /

This paper provides an overview of the design of means-tested Guaranteed Minimum Income schemes, which constitute an important component of social protection systems in European countries. It discusses how key design features differ across countries, including how countries balance the primary objec...

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Autor principal: Coady, David
Altres autors: Jahan, Samir, Matsumoto, Riki, Shang, Baoping
Format: Revista
Idioma:English
Publicat: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2021.
Col·lecció:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2021/179
Matèries:
Accés en línia:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Coady, David. 
245 1 0 |a Guaranteed Minimum Income Schemes in Europe :   |b Landscape and Design /  |c David Coady, Samir Jahan, Baoping Shang, Riki Matsumoto. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2021. 
300 |a 1 online resource (40 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
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520 3 |a This paper provides an overview of the design of means-tested Guaranteed Minimum Income schemes, which constitute an important component of social protection systems in European countries. It discusses how key design features differ across countries, including how countries balance the primary objective of poverty alleviation against the desire to both manage the work disincentives inherent in such programs and contain fiscal cost. The analysis finds a clear trade-off between both concerns in practice, with many countries combining low generosity with low benefit withdrawal rates (BWRs) thus prioritizing employment incentives over the primary objective of poverty alleviation. Many countries can reduce this trade off by combining higher generosity with higher BWRs. Countries with very high BWRs should consider reducing these, including through allowing income disregards and time dependent (rather than income-dependent) benefit withdrawal. The work disincentives associated with higher BWRs can also be attenuated through strengthening complementary activation policies that incentivize and support participation in the labor market. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
650 7 |a Efficiency  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Government Policy  |2 imf 
650 7 |a National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Optimal Taxation  |2 imf 
650 7 |a Provision and Effects of Welfare Program  |2 imf 
700 1 |a Jahan, Samir. 
700 1 |a Matsumoto, Riki. 
700 1 |a Shang, Baoping. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2021/179 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2021/179/001.2021.issue-179-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library