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|z 9781451846850
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|a 1018-5941
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|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Mani, Muthukumara.
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|a The Rule of Law and the Pattern of Environment Protection /
|c Muthukumara Mani, Per Fredriksson.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2002.
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|a 1 online resource (27 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a We develop and test a theory of the rule of law and environmental policy formation. In our model an increase in the degree of rule of law has two opposing partial effects on environmental policy: first, a greater share of policy decisions are implemented according to law; second, industry bribery efforts increase because more is at stake. Moreover, we find that an increase in corruptibility of policymakers lowers the stringency of environmental policy. The empirical findings suggest that a greater degree of rule of law raises environmental policy stringency, but the effect is lower where corruptibility is high.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Fredriksson, Per.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2002/049
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/049/001.2002.issue-049-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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