01869cas a2200313 a 4500 AALejournalIMF006280 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d 5.00 USD 9781451962642 1018-5941 BD-DhAAL BD-DhAAL Shamloo, Maral. Optimal Monetary Policy with Overlapping Generations of Policymakers / Maral Shamloo. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2010. 1 online resource (36 pages) IMF Working Papers <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students In this paper I study the effect of imperfect central bank commitment on inflationary outcomes. I present a model in which the monetary authority is a committee that consists of members who serve overlapping, finite terms. Older and younger generations of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members decide on policy by engaging in a bargaining process. I show that this setup gives rise to a continuous measure of the degree of monetary authority's commitment. The model suggests that the lower the churning rate or the longer the tenure time, the closer social welfare will be to that under optimal commitment policy. Mode of access: Internet Monetary Policy imf MPC Member imf Objective Function imf Standard Deviation imf WP imf United Kingdom imf IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2010/032 Full text available on IMF http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/032/001.2010.issue-032-en.xml IMF e-Library